Sunday, December 24, 2023

 

An Important Consideration

It’s been a decade since I’ve written anything here, so I decided to update this site in order to see if my writing has changed, because my life certainly has. Think about the word decision. Now, think about the word incision, and realize that a decision is a type of cutting, a type of violence. The moment we decide to read something called literature is the moment following a decision, many decisions in fact. In the moment we decide to read literature we have already made a cutting judgment. What are we doing when we read at all, regardless of if what we read is considered literature or not? We’re cutting into something like time, being, “life”, and myriad other oblique nouns. Nonetheless, this essay is about reading, whatever that means.

 That which separates literature from reading a recipe book, or fanfiction, or great journalism is not such an easy distinction to make. Look up the definition, if you haven’t already, I dare you. Defining literature is not as easy as, say, defining gasoline. Maybe defining gasoline isn’t that simple, either, because gasoline has properties and ingredients and levels of potency and concentration in octane. But we have a sense of what gasoline is and does: it’s fuel, and it makes machines go via tiny, controlled explosions. Literature, too, has ingredients, properties, levels of potency and concentration, but defining just what literature is requires a degree of expertise that I cannot hope to claim for myself. I can say, however, the decision to read something called literature already has a value judgment built into it. Reading literature, in my view, is reading something that has stood the test of time, a work that has been previously separated, cut off, and set apart from the rest, for some reason or another, by authorities and experts. Whatever it is, literature remains something mystifying and, at the same time, edifying, and it continues to do so for a long period of that thing called time. What is literature? What is literature’s task? Who decides? I’m not sure, but I think I might know what literature is when I read it.

So it goes with philosophy: the moment we decide to read philosophy we have already done something in the way of inquiring into a concept; a curiosity, even if that curiosity is something as apparently innocuous as wondering what is being said, what is being argued, and why? Nonetheless, if I’m going to write an argument for the reading of philosophy alongside that of literature, then I must first attempt to define just what is philosophy and what is literature, and I’ve already shown that defining literature remains a messy exercise, so maybe the to-be verb “is” has something to do with it: it’s an ontologically rich verb. 

Since defining philosophy exists as an ongoing process, it is considered to be the long, great conversation, after all, then I must do it myself, here, in Richardson, Texas in the year 2023. I define philosophy as the tradition of contemplative writing, but this definition seems inadequate, and for a variety of reasons, because all writing is contemplative, isn’t it? What I mean is all contemplative writing in the tradition known as philosophy. Alas, still inadequate. What I mean is all contemplative writing in what is known as the Western tradition of philosophy. Is this adequate enough? Do we know what I mean when I say the Western tradition? None of us can name all the philosophers who make up this tradition, but do we at least have a sense of what I mean? In these questions should be, at the very least, a sense of consideration when choosing to read philosophy alongside literature. Which philosophy? Which tradition? Which literature? Which time period? So many questions. So many dumb and impotent answers. Writing of philosophy, Karl Jaspers asks:

[w]hat is the task of philosophy today? We know the familiar answer: None—for it is unreal, the private business of a guild of specialists. These philosophers, we are told, occupy university chairs dating from the Middle Ages and meet in futility, at conventions which are the modern occasions for showing off. Their monologues are attested by a voluminous literature, scarcely read and rarely bought, except for a few fashionable publications with snob appeal. If the press, as the organ of public opinion takes note of these books and periodicals which gather dust in libraries, it does so without real interest. All in all, we hear, philosophy is superfluous, ossified, behind the times, waiting only for its disappearance. It no longer has a task.[1]

I hear similar sentiments when I tell people I’m studying philosophy in graduate school. Their questions always tend to sound something like: Really? What are you going to do with that? They rarely get the joke when I respond with something as about as specific as the word “do” in the question you just asked me. If they persist in questioning me, which rarely happens, I just say I’ll teach high school or introduction courses at a community college. Maybe I’ll start with Heraclitus, because I think he’s on to something, and the fact that only fragments of his body of work exists is a commentary on existence itself, and I find that hauntingly beautiful, because that’s how life tends to happen: in fragments. Of course, I understand the meaning of do when I’m asked what I’m going to do with a degree in philosophy. People mean what job, what career, what money-making enterprise am I aiming for in investing such time, energy, and stress in a field that, in Jaspers’ words, “no longer has a task.”

I realize Jaspers is being facetious, here, but philosophy is a sort of specialty. I don’t know many individuals outside of the university setting who read it for fun. I used to, and that’s what brought me to the university. Now, I have to, and I’m not fan of many have-tos. But I respect philosophy; I’m intrigued and profoundly interested in the questions it asks. For, that is precisely the task of philosophy: to ask questions. Not just any questions, but profound, cutting questions.

Now that I’ve briefly described what literature is and what philosophy does, I must focus on one important consideration in bringing these two worlds together. One extremely important consideration is selecting the type of philosophy to go with the literature we’ve made the decision to read, presuming, of course, the literature has been chosen in such a fashion as to warrant philosophical companionship, because I have the sense that literature can, does, and will stand alone, by itself, triumphantly rejecting any external influence brought to bear on it. This is, after all, one of literature’s most prominent characteristics, one of its ingredients. In selecting the philosophical accoutrement, one might ask questions like which branch seems to correspond to the literature in question? Metaphysics, cosmology, ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, ontology, political, and my favorite, “other”? Of course, the selection process isn’t as clear cut as it might seem. Don’t all of these branches overlap in some form or another? Some philosophers have written about literature and language, so maybe starting with those particular philosophers would serve as a good starting point. But then we’d have to consider time periods. It might be prudent to consider philosophers of the same period in which the literature in question was written. But this seems too limiting an approach. Regardless, (or regardful) I’m still left with the question why would we want to read philosophy together with literature?, since both seem to be doing similar, yet different things, in different realms, though in a shared universe. What if we chose a topic to investigate in our literature, something like, say, suicide, and then chose a philosopher who has written on that topic, and then compared our findings with what we’ve found in the literature, develop an argument, and then support our argument with both the philosophy and literature together? Isn’t this policy for graduate schoolwork? And then?

When we read Camus and contend with his interrogation of suicide as an attempt to escape the absurd[2], or when we read Cioran’s response that “a book is a postponed suicide”[3], or when we read Hume on suicide[4], what we’re doing is contending with deep existential questions; we are contending with our own existence and the ability to quit it. Literature has some things to say about suicide as well. Consider Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther, Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, Othello, or Hamlet’s to be or not to be soliloquy. How many works of literature can we think of that concern suicide? Many.

We make emotional investments (or emotions are evoked) when reading literature. When reading literature evokes a feeling, then we tend to want to know why, so we grab a philosophy book, say, on the philosophy of emotion, and try to make sense of the senses we’re making. Or, we recall Kant writing about how appreciating art is a type of moral action, and we want to know why, because that statement reveals to us that we have a certain moral responsibility when appreciating art (reading literature for instance) and though Kant makes a distinction between the beautiful and the sublime, and the sublime is not really attached to appreciating art, but beauty is, it is in this very distinction where philosophy is happening; Kant is making a distinction precisely where judgement is concerned, where a decision is requisite:

…we often designate beautiful objects of nature or of art with names that seem to be grounded in moral judging. We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, or fields smiling and joyful; even colors are called innocent, modest or tender, because they arouse sensations that contain something analogical to the consciousness of a mental state produced by moral judgements.[5]

This is part of philosophy’s task: to clarify all sorts of existential questions of meaning, of judgment, of purpose, of responsibility, of time, of (insert ambiguous noun here). Philosophy’s task is to attempt to clarify. Isit working? Isn’t determining whether or not a philosophy is successful also a strange type of judgement?

What is literature? What is literature’s task? What is philosophy? What is philosophy’s task? And, what are we to do by bringing these two together? These are extremely complicated questions. Literature offers the philosopher what he or she desires most: immutable truths.[6] Sure, we may quibble, converse, discuss, or argue over the relationship between, say, King Lear and Cordelia. We might chalk it up to Lear’s madness or Cordelia’s alterity. We might agree with Stanley Cavell that the play’s aboutness pertains to acknowledgement. We might debate over Edmund’s connection to or animosity towards his father, and we might hope to make sense of these connections (concoctions?) through reading philosophy alongside King Lear.[7] We might contend with each other about Shakespeare’s genius residing in a type of paradox or hiding in something like clear ambiguity. We might discuss the reversal of gender roles, the upended familial hierarchy, or the wisdom found in the fool. Whereas the text is indeed open to a buffet of interpretations, it would be a complete falsehood to say that Cordelia wasn’t Lear’s daughter, or that Edmund wasn’t a bastard. These truths are salient, immutable; dare I say absolute? “Doing” philosophy, then, is a natural disposition when reading literature. Reading remains, after all, a type of doing closely associated with the doing of philosophy: inquiry towards clarity. When we read a work of literature, we insert ourselves into the text in one way or another. We imagine scenes or scenarios, we listen to dialogues, and we might even get emotional about seeming injustices. Even if we don’t understand a passage, or if we’re frustrated or bored or don’t like what we’re reading we are still engaging, we are still doing something: “[t]he mind’s first step is to distinguish what is true and what is false. However, as soon as thought reflects on itself, what it first discovers is a contradiction.”[8] This is natural, and it seems Cavell is on to something: acknowledging the text is acknowledging something about ourselves.

Seeing literature through the lens of philosophy and seeing philosophy through the lens of literature are not one and the same thing; there exists some distinction between these two worlds. On the surface we can say that reading literature along with philosophy reveals concepts, notions, models, viewpoints, and ideas which might not have been considered before. Of course, we need some boundaries. Imagine reading Nietzsche through the lens of Kurt Vonnegut Jr., or imagine reading Fifty Shades of Grey through the lens of Aquinas, (if you can even imagine reading Fifty Shades of Grey, or Aquinas for that matter).[9] These questions aren’t ridiculous. Would I be merely forcing a philosopher into fan-fiction? Why can’t I do this? Or, why shouldn’t I do this? Would I be doing Nietzsche or Vonnegut a disservice? Do I need to read philosophy to understand this? Absolutely not. So what, then, is the question?  If we are to consider the enquiry of reading philosophy together with literature, then we need to set up some parameters, and this takes expertise, specialists, which I refuse to lie to you by arguing I have what it takes to set up anything like a parameter. We might say the task of literature is to portray the task of philosophy through its characters, narration, setting, plot, and form, but making these claims requires that most slippery of words in order to do so: the word interpretation. We can be thankful, then, that literature offers us immutable truths, and we can be simultaneously thankful that philosophy provides us with the tools to question these immutabilities.

I’m afraid I’ve not said much as to why we should consider reading philosophy together with literature, but I hope through reading this essay you come away understanding that we should indeed do both, that is read philosophy and read literature, and we should read both together. But determining what philosophy and what literature to read together remains a difficult endeavor, and one which requires a bit of digging and defining. So, asking what is philosophy, what is literature, and what is the relationship between the two? might be summed up in that tiny to-be verb fixed pale-blue-dot-like in the middle of the question, in the middle of that vast space. The question remains ontological, which is to say, existential, so I’ll end here, and then leave that decision up to you.



[1] Jaspers, Karl. Philosophy and the World: Selected Essays. Gateway Edition. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963.

[2] Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. New York: Vintage, 1991.

[3] Cioran, E.M. The Trouble with Being Born. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Arcade, 2012.

[4] Hume, David. Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul. Honolulu: World Library, 2009.

[5] Kant, Emmanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Leitch, Vincent B. The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. Second edition., W.W Norton & Co., 2010. p. 449.

[6] Eco, Umberto. On Literature. New York: Harcourt, 2004.

[7] Shakespeare, William, and R. A. Foakes. King Lear. [New ed.] / edited by R.A. Foakes., Arden Shakespeare, 2004.

[8] Myth of Sisyphus. p. 16.

[9] Warning! Value judgment approaching.

Tuesday, August 24, 2021

 August 2021.


Things have changed, but that is the nature of "things" in this context. This is a test. This is a test to see whether or not these letters stick to this virtual landscape. If they do, then I'll continue to post letters here. If they do not, then I've wasted thirty seconds by typing these letters. 

Monday, December 2, 2013

Boredom

Considering a popular notion of Despair:
That it is born out of an unwillingness,
an unwillingness to be a self without,
a self coping with a loss, (or coping with a negative gain).

So: Despair comes from an unwillingness of becoming,
becoming the person who is specifically and inevitably without.

Example: Mourning a loss, (either by death or distraction).
The person who has lost someone significant despairs at being,
he or she despairs at being the person who is now inexorably without.
Despair is the unwillingness to accept the altered state of absence.

Despair is ‘amartia 1], and is hauntingly similar to Boredom, the deadliest of all inadequacies:

     People with experience maintain that proceeding from a basic principle is                     supposed to be very reasonable; I yield to them and proceed from the basic principle                 that all people are boring. Or is there anyone who would be boring enough to                             contradict me in this regard?...Boredom is the root of all evil.
     This can be traced back to the very beginning of the world. The gods were                   bored; therefore they created human beings. Adam was bored because he was alone;                 therefore Eve was created. Since that moment, boredom entered the world and grew                 in quantity in exact proportion to the growth of population. Adam was bored alone;                   then Adam and Eve were bored together; then Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel                         were bored en famille. After that, the population of the world increased and the                           nations were bored en masse–SØren Kierkegaard

We get into all kinds of trouble when we think that we are bored, and this will without the slightest doubt lead to despair*.






*Written for one person in particular.





                               




[i] Literally “missing the mark,” often translated as sin.

Thursday, October 24, 2013

Roses are red
Violets are blue...
wait just a cotton picking moment,
Violets are violet.

Friday, October 4, 2013

Real Estate

We’ve driven by several memorials on this trip. Many of them were on the interstates. Others were on back highways and a few on country roads. Some had crucifixes. Others had wreathes. Sometimes notes were attached, though I couldn’t read them while moving.

I remember one memorial very well: We took a detour on one of the varicose turn-offs while campsite hunting on Last Dollar Road. Tucked away about a tenth of a mile was this tiny makeshift memorial. I crouched next to it. A man had lost his lifelong companion: a woman who lived between forty and fifty years. A small votive, some plastic flowers, and a pewter statue of St. Peter were all bound together with a small flowered garland. 

I read the note and it made me sad. 
I wish I could remember exactly what it said. 
It had something to do with the man’s soul now missing a piece. 
I just remember that the lady died in 2011. 

Everything struck me at once: the beauty of mountain we were on, the isolation, the cold wind whipping through the Aspen and Pine. I stared at the engraved and hyphenated dates, dates which were now bound by parentheses; two finite points on a seemingly infinite line. It was then that I felt this man’s grief. I felt compassion for a man whom I had never even met; I felt the weight of his loss and I felt it immediately.

We climbed back into the car and I was silent for a moment. “This is a very specific place” I thought.

And I continued to think about it.

“Place becomes specific when a memory is involved,” I thought to myself. This place is specific because this man placed his memorial here. Even if we don’t know the people or the stories involved we still understand the symbol here. I understand that this place has been specified by many memories.

I also understand that this place has been specified by one final memory, and I understand the symbols within this symbol, too. The votive for light, the saint for guidance and favor, the dates for linear time when this person existed, the flowers for youth, life, respect, beauty, comfort, rest, and so on. I also understand the parentheses. But why here? Why tucked away into the side of this particularly remote mountain? Why here at this very spot?

Maybe this is where they met, on a backcountry excursion through sheer coincidence.
Maybe this is where they would sneak off as teenagers to figure out the world and to make love.
Maybe this is where he realized that the two of them undoubtedly shared one soul.
Maybe this is where they decided that they truly loved one another.
Maybe this is where they decided to get married.
                                                or,
Maybe this is where she told him that she was sick.

And I thought about this for a while.

But the drive down was beautiful: full of twists, turns, switchbacks, and overlooks. Exponentially pastoral, idyllic, bucolic, and so on. Vistas and views that a person couldn’t quantify. And back there, tucked away on the side of a mountain was this place were gravity felt a little stronger just for a second.


Yeah, we’ve seen lots of memorials on this trip, but this one was very specific.




..

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

The Gentle Art of Selfishness


Realistic anxiety strikes us as something very rational and intelligible. We may say of it that it is a reaction to the perception of an external danger—that is, of an injury which is expected and foreseen. It is connected with the flight reflex and it may be regarded as a manifestation of the self-preservative instinct. On what occasions anxiety appears—that is to say, in the face of what objects and in what situations—will of course depend to a large extent on the state of a person’s knowledge and on his sense of power vis-à-vis the external world. We can quite understand how a savage is afraid of a cannon and frightened by an eclipse of the sun, while a white man, who knows how to handle the instrument and can foretell the eclipse, remains without anxiety in these circumstances. On other occasions it is actually superior knowledge that promotes anxiety, because it makes an early recognition of the danger possible. Thus the savage will be terrified at a trail in the jungle that tells an uninformed person nothing, because it warns him of the proximity of a wild animal; and an experienced sailor will look with terror at a small cloud in the sky that seems trivial to a passenger, because it tells him of an approaching hurricane.
-Sigmund Freud.

Consider the tiny cloud.
Consider the storm in its infancy.
Consider that those who have seen and recognized the nascent storm have a compelling anxiety for its inevitable landfall. Superior knowledge, then, means superior burden, depression; oppression; forces too potent for any human to resist and overcome.

“Take therefore not a thought for tomorrow; for tomorrow will look upon itself.”
Mattew 6:34

To totally decontextualize the above is to reiterate a cliché that had been, up until this point, swimming around in the minds of many, many humans. The cliché still swims; knowledge has the capacity to overturn exponentially overstated “truths,” but we’ve eaten that fruit already and thus learned that knowledge is cruel, for it can undo the most stoic of individuals. I look to the clouds and I see water vapor in multiform. My mind shapes the clouds into recognizable objects depending upon what mood I’m in, what anxieties I have.

We gaze upon that oncoming storm and if we haven’t any anxiety, then we haven’t any idea what moves towards us. If we do know, and we choose to ignore it, then we lie to ourselves. We listen as the waves begin to crash. We hear the thunder begin its low, unearthly growl, and we can feel ourselves moved by potential, yet all we see are clouds.

If we are honest, truly, truly honest, then all we can do is make ourselves comfortable and brace for impact. There is only a certain amount of comfort one can achieve, and often such comfort is short-lived and fleeting. This is anxiety, and sometimes it looks like selfishness.

Monday, September 2, 2013

Some Brief Nonsense on Being and Becoming

The equation is simple:
(joey) + (notion) = (joey-and-notion-becoming-a-new-being/type-of-being). 
A + B = C.
Easy as pie.

So, my wife is pregnant.

Let's think about this for a moment before we move on.

(Think Here)


This means that I’m going to be a father.
This is very complicated.
Much like the concept of being itself is also very complicated.

Here’s what I mean:

(joey) + (going-to-be-a-father) = (New notion of joey-who-is-going-to-be-a-father)

I told you it was complicated. To use sort of Heideggerian lingo, the “entities” within each of the above parentheses are separate entities in and of themselves. I would say that each one is its own individual “being,” but this cannot be the case for the notion of going-to-be-a-father, such an entity hasn’t any actual being itself, (though many beings certainly have it!).

So, to simplify, just consider the parenthetical ingredients as what they truly are: variables.

Now, since the concepts of “joey” and “going-to-be-a-father” are two separate concepts, (concepts that I thought might be exclusive for much, much longer than it appears to be, well, happening) so it must follow that the result is also variable, though not a variable. You see, the result “joey-who-is-going-to-be-a-father” has to be a new being; a more responsible being, a more considerate being, a being who can forgive and forget, a being who can act as pillow or punching bag, a being who can offer comfort, support, and an occasional ass-whooping, a being who can negotiate, interrogate, and turn an occasional blind eye to a dumb choice or poor decision, arts of which I, this present joey, have mastered. This new being will have to consider a whole new universe of information, a universe that doesn't revolve around lil' ol' me. And this is where it gets complicated: Me is all I know.

New “entities” in their infancy tend toward and are prone to severe existential contemplation.

* * * * * * * * *



It will be interesting to reflect on these few words when my son or daughter is old, or old-er, or old enough, or whatever the hell. I can see myself now, pining to be the “me” I was however long ago, remembering how good it was or how different it was. Yet I can also see this new aged version of myself mocking the me of yesteryear for being so green, so damned naïve, (which sounds like something older me would say). I can pine and pine and pine, but the notion of joey-who-is-going-to-be-a-father will be old hat by then, for the joey-who-is-a-father will be an entity in and of himself.